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ABSTRACT 
Individuals often get lost behind the diagnosis 
of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) while widespread 
differences between these patients are more 
common than similarities. Socioemotional Selec- 
tivity Theory (SST) suggests that as we age our 
goals change from future-oriented (acquiring 
new information) to present-oriented (enhancing 
the emotional, especially positive, meaning of 
encounters). The goal of the current article is to 
examine whether the principles of SST might 
also apply for people with AD. Some aspects of 
SST are found especially in the early stages of 
AD when awareness is often intact and cognitive 
impairment is relatively limited. This review has 
clinical significance for the treatment of AD be- 
cause it focuses on what is important to the in- 
dividual rather than treating patients as a ho- 
mogenous group. It also highlights the import- 
ance of social networks and emphasizes the role 
of the proxy in AD care. Lastly, it suggests that if 
those with AD (like the healthy elderly) have a 
positivity bias then positive emotional stimuli/ 
wording/instructions could usefully be employed 
in their daily treatment. I suggest that SST may 
be a useful starting point when attempting to 
address what matters to individuals with AD and 
conclude by providing a few suggestions for 
future studies. 
 
Keywords: Alzheimer’s Disease; Socioemotional 
Selectivity Theory; Individual Differences;  
Awareness; Positivity Bias; Socialization 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Negative stereotypes of elderly persons are plentiful 
among the general public [1]. The old are typically por- 
trayed as being lonely, as having more mood disorders 
than younger adults, as being “stuck in their ways”, of 
becoming more and more like each other and less like 
the individuals they are with each passing year, and of 
being sick and dependent and psychologically and cogni- 
tively impaired. Yet, the truth is that many elderly people 
live fulfilling lives and successful aging is more the norm 
than the exception, while at the same time individual 
differences in coping style, personality, cognitive func- 
tioning and motivation are widespread. 
1.1. Socioemotional Selectivity Theory  
(SST) 
Socioemotional selectivity theory (SST) [2] was ini- 
tially put forward as an attempt to explain the so-called 
“paradox of aging” which refers to the finding that while 
physical health tends to decline as we age subjective 
well-being may be maintained or even improve [3]. Time 
perspective rather than chronological aging is at the heart 
of SST, and suggests that as people begin to realize that 
they are running out of time, whether due to old age or 
terminal illness, their goals shift towards present con- 
cerns and away from what could assist them in the future. 
Furthermore, SST suggests that when time is limited we 
begin to focus on the emotional aspects of situations and 
coping and prefer to spend time with loved ones rather 
than seek out new relationships. Elderly people are thus 
motivated to maximize positive experiences, minimize 
the negative and spend quality-time with loved ones in 
smaller social networks. The classic SST experiment as- 
ks participants to choose who they would like to spend 
time with in a variety of contexts from a predetermined 
list. Older adults tend to choose an emotionally close 
social partner while younger subjects tend to pick stran- 
gers or acquaintances especially if these social contacts 
can provide them with new information. 
Furthermore, according to SST, a positivity bias exists 
for healthy elderly subjects whereby they prioritize pro- 
cessing positively valenced information and allocate 
fewer resources to negative (and therefore distressing) 
information. This enables older adults to optimize their 
emotional experiences. The positivity bias is usually ma- 
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nifested as better attention to and/or memory for posi- 
tively valenced vs negative stimuli (e.g. [4]). In many 
memory tasks, while older adults tend to perform more 
poorly overall than younger subjects, both groups tend to 
remember more emotional compared to neutral material, 
the so-called Emotional Memory Advantage (EMA) [5]. 
Some researchers have found a valence effect (positive > 
negative) in the healthy elderly while others have failed 
to find this effect. Whether a positivity bias is found or 
not appears to depend on the type of stimuli, the experi- 
mental design, the delay between encoding and retrieval, 
and the instructions used at encoding [6].  
1.2. Alzheimer’s Disease 
1.2.1. Cause and Clinical Manifestations 
What causes Alzheimer’s disease (AD) has been wi- 
dely disputed in the literature with genetics, lifestyle, and 
environmental effects all mentioned. How it affects the 
brain is however clear with plaques and tangles being 
hallmarks of the disease and progressive deterioration 
and cell-death the result. While AD is a devastating brain 
disorder so much of its clinical course is behavioral, in-
cluding: cognitive dysfunction (typically memory and 
intellectual impairment), problem behaviors (wandering, 
agitation), disturbed psychological states (depression, de- 
lusions), and adverse psychosocial consequences (fa- 
mily stress/burden, costs to society) [7]. Also, because 
AD is progressive the needs of the patient and caregiver 
will change over time. 
In the early stages of AD problems with instrumental 
activities in daily living (IADLs) (e.g. forgetting to take 
medications or how to drive a car etc) become more and 
more apparent. In the cognitive realm, difficulties with 
attention, concentration, working and especially episodic 
memory are found early on. Later in the course of the 
disease procedural memory abilities involving uncon- 
scious or rote recollections also start to deteriorate (e.g. 
riding a bike, making a cup of tea). These may remain 
spared for quite a long time in AD due to their reliance 
on less-affected brain regions (including the basal gan- 
glia and the cerebellum) [8]. Emotional (and implicit) 
memory may be spared until the later stages, while both 
emotional processing and facial expressions can be inap- 
propriate or exaggerated in AD. Emotional attachments 
on the other hand tend to remain strong until the end 
when even remembering loved ones may disappear as 
the person retreats into themselves. Indeed, patients have 
been known to “shadow” their caregivers and some re- 
searchers [e.g. 9] have suggested that this may provide 
emotional comfort to increasingly confused patients. 
As AD progresses from the early to the middle stages 
the person may become agitated and show more evi- 
dence of disruptive behaviours. They become increas- 
ingly confused and memory loss becomes more profound 
as do changes in sensory perception and problems with 
executive functioning [e.g. 9]. More help with everyday 
activities of daily living (ADLs) (e.g. washing and dres- 
sing themselves) will become necessary while patients 
can still perform basic, familiar tasks and remain emo- 
tionally attached to things and people that are familiar. 
In the final stages both short and long-term memory 
declines are severe and most language abilities are lost. 
The patient begins to lose self-awareness often to the 
extent that they do not recognize themselves. At the end 
even basic abilities like swallowing may be difficult as 
the person enters a vegetative state. It has been suggested 
that a person with AD basically reverts back to an infan- 
tile stage, with neurological reflexes being the last to 
remain—so-called “reverse ontogeny” [10]. 
1.2.2. Prevalence and How to Diagnose AD 
A recent prevalence estimate for AD stands at 35.6 
million worldwide [11]. Last year new AD guidelines 
[12,13] appeared with the focus shifting from symp- 
toms/diagnosis to both the early preclinical stages and to 
how biomarkers may aid diagnostic accuracy. AD has a 
long prodromal/preclinical phase lasting from 10 - 20 
years before the diagnosis is made [14,15]. In the first 
preclinical phase, patients are asymptomatic or have sub- 
tle symptoms/complaints. Diagnosis is generally made 
when standard diagnostic criteria are reached, typically 
including gradual (episodic) memory impairment and at 
least one of the following (aphasia, apraxia, agnosia, 
executive dysfunction). Also important is a significant 
impairment in daily functioning [see for example 16]. 
1.3. Alzheimer’s Disease and SST 
Despite recent calls in the literature we still know rela- 
tively little about the internal experience of those with 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD). This is mainly due to the fact 
that there is scepticism about how accurate self-asse- 
ssment is in the demented and whether cognitive im- 
pairment and especially communication difficulties make 
finding out impossible. Mast [17] suggested some strate- 
gies for accessing the internal experiences of those with 
dementia and emphasised the importance of attempting 
to understand them as individuals. 
People with terminal illnesses (e.g. younger patients 
with AIDS and/or cancer) [18] have been tested using 
SST tasks. These patients tend to behave like the elderly 
in that they also develop a limited time perspective, and 
consequently change their personal goals showing a pre- 
ference for close social relationships. AD, despite pe- 
ople living for an average of 5 - 10 years after diagnosis, 
is terminal with patients typically dying from complica-
tions (lung infections, etc) rather than from neural de- 
generation per se. It is therefore not unreasonable to as- 
sume that those with AD should also preferentially pro- 
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cess positive stimuli and prefer close social relationships 
rather than superficial encounters with careworkers or 
other acquaintances. Whether this occurs in AD is obvi- 
ously closely linked to how aware the person is of his/her 
limitations at the different stages of this progressive di- 
sease. 
Whether the premises behind SST also hold for those 
with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is an important question 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, does the “paradox of 
aging” also apply to those with AD? While accelerated 
deterioration is expected in these patients, SST would 
predict that subjective well-being may be maintained or 
even improve. Secondly, do those with AD seek out po- 
sitive experiences, avoid the negative and spend qua- 
lity-time with loved ones in smaller social networks (as 
suggested by SST in the healthy elderly)? Certainly, per- 
sonal relationships are likely to become more important 
as the illness develops but what motivates those with AD 
and does this change over time? Finally, is a positivity 
bias found in AD? If so, emotionally positive stimuli 
could be usefully employed in developing new behav-
ioral treatments which could be used alongside medica-
tion, the goal being to maintain the patient’s quality of 
life for as long as possible. 
To summarize: do those with AD (like the healthy el- 
derly) show a shift from knowledge- to emotion-focused 
social goals as suggested by SST? The main premises of 
SST include: a) that there is positivity bias in memory 
and learning in the elderly; b) that as people age, smaller, 
more personal social networks become important to them 
and c) that behavior is goal-driven and by extension, 
elderly people are aware of their motivations and subse- 
quent behaviors. This article will examine each of these 
three premises of SST in AD and go on to discuss what 
the results could mean in terms of this theory.  
2. METHOD 
A number of search engines including Google Scholar, 
PsycINFO, Medline, PubMed, and ScienceDirect among 
others were used to search for relevant literature. The 
following keywords (and combinations thereof) were 
used: Socioemotional Selectivity Theory, social, goal, 
motivation, emotion, Emotional Memory Advantage, el- 
derly, aging, relationships, Alzheimer’s disease &/or de- 
mentia, individual/patient perspective, memory (explicit 
and implicit), arousal, valence, quality of life, behavior, 
time perspective, (self) awareness, anosognosia, orienta- 
tion, positivity bias, emotional processing, socialization 
in AD. While no studies were found which have directly 
examined SST in AD many of the separate premises be- 
hind the theory have been investigated in AD and these 
are discussed in turn below under the relevant subhead- 
dings. SST has been widely accepted for the healthy el- 
derly [19] and whether it applies to AD (which some 
researchers see as extreme aging, (e.g. [20]) is, I believe, 
worthwhile as we move towards more individual-based 
treatments. 
3. RESULTS 
3.1. Emotional Memory Advantage (EMA)  
and the Positivity Bias in AD 
Studies have typically shown that older adults tend to 
1) be more effective at maintaining positive affect; 2) 
that if they do experience negative affect it tends to be 
short-lived compared to younger adults; 3) that they are 
good at regulating their emotion, and; 4) that they have a 
bias to remember emotional stimuli that have a positive 
valence above neutral and negative stimuli and that this 
has been observed for autobiographical events, choices, 
words, pictures and faces [18]. A positivity bias has not 
always been found however [21]. Two theories have 
been suggested to account for positivity biases in the 
elderly: the “cognitive control” [22] and the “simplified 
processing” [23] accounts. The first suggests that only 
the elderly with enough cognitive control will show a po- 
sitivity bias because the usual tendency is for people to 
focus on the negative. The second account suggests that 
older people focus on the positive as a way to simplify 
the information they must process. 
Uttl and Graf [6] have suggested however that many 
of the experiments conducted in this field have major 
methodological flaws including floor and ceiling effects 
making it difficult to compare young and old groups. 
They also note that arousal ratings are often not mea- 
sured despite the claim that the effects are largely driven 
by arousal; that emotional stimuli used in many experi- 
ments tend to be more interrelated than the neutral sti- 
muli so confounding semantic relatedness with stimulus 
emotionality; and finally, that most studies have used 
mixed lists and emotional stimuli tend to be more dis-
tinctive than neutral in these lists compared to ‘pure’ lists. 
Mathews [24] also highlighted the need to take individ-
ual differences into account, especially the effects of 
mood and personality on processing of emotional events/ 
stimuli, while Isaacowitz et al. [25] focused on the need 
to measure the time course of emotional processing in 
the elderly. 
There have been surprisingly few studies which have 
investigated whether people with AD have an EMA de- 
spite recent interest in this topic [26,27]. Some resear- 
chers have found no EMA (e.g. [26,28,29]) while some 
do find an EMA in AD (e.g. [30-34]). A review of the 
literature [Blessing et al., 35] stated that people with AD 
showed a reduced or blunted EMA compared to healthy 
elderly controls, while Klein-Koerkamp et al. [27] con- 
cluded that the EMA could be preserved in AD “under 
specific retrieval instructions” (p. 1). Blessing et al., also 
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found in a later empirical study [36] that while the ex- 
plicit emotional memory system was compromised in 
their AD patients, the implicit emotional memory system 
was spared. These authors suggested that this could be 
explained by the heterogeneity of amygdala (and other 
brain) damage typically found in the, already heteroge- 
neous AD group. Furthermore, while some researchers 
have found a positive advantage [37], others have found 
a negative advantage in their AD group [38]. Brueckner 
and Moritz [39] using an emotional variant of the De- 
ese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm to investi- 
gate false memories, found that those with mild- mode- 
rate AD showed more false memories in comparison to a 
healthy elderly control group and more specifically, a si- 
gnificant bias to falsely remember positively-valenced 
stimuli.  
Some researchers have justifiably separated emotional 
memory from emotional processing and have found nor- 
mal emotional ratings/processing in AD while subse- 
quent memory may/may not be compromised (see e.g. 
[40]). Studies on emotional processing in AD have how- 
ever also produced mixed findings. For example, Bediou 
et al. [41] investigated face processing in Mild Cognitive 
Impairment, AD and Fronto-temporal dementia (FTD) 
and found that while gender recognition was preserved, 
patients with mild or moderate AD had problems with 
expression recognition while those with FTD were im- 
paired for both expression recognition and gaze direction. 
In an interesting study which assessed emotional recog- 
nition in AD patients using face, voice and music stimuli, 
Drapeau et al. [42] found that while the patients had dif- 
ficulty in identifying the emotional facial expressions of 
sadness, fear and disgust, they did not differ from con- 
trols in their recognition of happy, angry and surprising 
faces. Furthermore, the emotional recognition of voice 
and music stimuli was intact in the patients. 
For those who have found positivity bias in AD the 
suggestion has been made that these people might be 
attracted to positive stimuli because they are more sti- 
mulating for them while negative stimuli are avoided 
because they may depict disapproval or avoidance [39]. 
For many AD individuals, social approval is important 
(see following subsection). 
3.2. Social Networks, Relationships and  
Socialization in AD 
Both larger social networks and more social participa- 
tion have been associated with less cognitive decline in 
an elderly population of both African Americans and 
Caucasians [43] Intact social networks can be a buffer 
against physical and psychological stressors, may reduce 
morbidity rates in many diseases and lower mortality 
[44]. Remaining socially engaged may reduce the risk of 
getting dementia in the first place and provide other 
health benefits including a diminished chance of both 
disability and mortality. It has also been suggested that a 
poor or limited social network increases the risk of de- 
mentia by 60% [45]. However, other researchers have 
suggested that the size of the social network might not be 
the important factor. Rather it is the type of relationship 
that matters [46] with close relatives providing more be- 
nefits than neighbors or acquaintances, especially when 
people suffer from cognitive decline. This viewpoint is in 
direct agreement with SST. Some researchers are also 
beginning to investigate the social needs of demented 
individuals using for example published memoirs by wri- 
ters who are living with dementia [47]. Such work reco- 
gnises that these individuals remain people (and not vic- 
tims) despite their dementia. 
Two studies offer some relevant information about the 
social goal strivings of those living with AD. Cohen- 
Mansfield et al. [48] asked their AD participants which 
of a number of predetermined role identities were the 
most important to them. The family role specifically that 
of being a parent or grandparent, emerged. Cotrell and 
Hooker [49] found that their AD participants valued the 
same domains as the healthy elderly controls, namely: 
meaningfulness, deepening of family relationships and 
enjoyment of life, even when those with AD had dimini- 
shed awareness. These researchers also found that when 
the AD individuals reported goals related to family they 
(in accordance with SST) reported a more positive and 
less negative mood than people who did not report any 
such goals. Furthermore, clinical observations suggest 
that people with AD are happier when they can feel use- 
ful to others and that close attachment relationships are 
important to them [50]. 
It could be argued that a person who does not suffer 
from AD or any other disabilities has ample opportuni- 
ties to have reciprocal relationships. However when fa- 
ced with AD this gets more difficult with passing time 
and the balance in their relationships may not be optimal 
[36]. How dementia affects marriage is under-researched 
[51]. It is however reasonable to assume that a diagnosis 
of AD will alter the dynamics within marital (and other) 
relationships. The person with AD may become cast in 
the role of the victim with the relationship ultimately 
suffering a loss of shared meaning and interests [51]. 
Furthermore, family members may be more likely than 
acquaintances to a) adapt to the changing circumstances; 
b) use shared history; and c) adjust their relationships 
simply because they have more invested in the relation- 
ship in the first place [46]. It is of course important to 
keep in mind that people whose cognitive abilities de- 
cline are less able to participate in social situations and 
may therefore show a reduction in reciprocity over time 
[51]. Individuals with AD seem to find it difficult to 
maintain ties and relationships [52] as do indeed their 
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caregivers. 
The identity and role of the caregiver are also impor- 
tant. Conde-Sala et al. [53] found that spouses tend to 
have a more positive view of the relationship especially 
when the spouse has a higher educational level and when 
the person with AD has more functional autonomy. The- 
se researchers also found that adult children experienced 
more caregiver burden especially if the person with AD 
was also depressed. Apathy, depression, agitation, aggre- 
ssiveness and irritability are common behavioral distur- 
bances in AD and are often quoted as the most difficult 
for carers to cope with especially as they often become 
exacerbated over time [54]. Personality also has a direct 
impact not only on the relationships we have but on whe- 
ther they survive over time; not everyone can develop 
and maintain friendships for example [52]. Magai et al. 
[55] found no changes in personality from before the AD 
diagnosis until late into the disease’s progression, while 
Droës [56] stated that premorbid personalities were ac- 
centuated, exaggerated or even drasticcally changed by 
the progressing dementia. In a recent review, Robins 
Wahlin and Byrne [57] concluded that neuroticism and 
conscientiousness were the most likely of the personality 
traits to change with dementia and could be useful early 
markers of AD. 
The living situation of the person with AD has un- 
doubtedly a huge impact on their relationships, especial- 
lly when they must move into a residential care home 
and are therefore removed from their familiar home en- 
vironment. The last aspect which makes it very difficult 
for them to remain socially engaged is that their ability to 
communicate declines as the dementia progresses and 
many withdraw from social contact [58]. This occurs re- 
latively early with reductions in both comprehension and 
in meaningfulness of speech [59], while at the same time 
it is important to recognize that there are widespread in- 
dividual differences in communication abilities as is in- 
deed the case for all cognitive and behavioral domain- 
ns. 
3.3. Awareness and Motivation in AD 
The concept of awareness has been addressed in many 
different patient populations in the literature and the con- 
sensus seems to be that it is extremely difficult to mea- 
sure. Awareness measurements have typically depended 
not only on the insights of the patient but also of the ca- 
regivers (family and non-family). Questionnaires, inter- 
views and comparing neuropsychological performances 
on objective tests with subjective complaints have all 
been used, while the relationship between awareness and 
cognitive functioning is anything but straightforward. 
Awareness is not a unitary concept and should therefore 
always be discussed in the context in which it is mea- 
sured. Normann et al. [60] also stated that awareness can 
fluctuate within an individual, while at the same time 
their life-long personalities and dispositions will also 
affect it. Clare [65] distinguishes between three levels of 
awareness: “on-line monitoring”, “evaluative judgement” 
and “meta-representation” and finds that even in the ad- 
vanced stages of AD patients tend to retain the first 2 
with some aspects of the third also remaining.  
Absence or loss of insight (anosognosia) has however 
been found in many different forms in AD [60] including: 
memory loss, executive functioning, blindsight, and/or 
the ability to live independently. It is entirely likely that 
level of awareness will also affect what motivates the 
individual with AD. How severe anosognosia is also 
varies considerably [49,61]. The degree of anosognosia 
may also correlate inversely with dementia severity (e.g. 
[62]; but see [61] who refute this suggestion). A disso- 
ciation can also exist with lack of awareness of cognitive 
dysfunctioning and some awareness of behavioral symp- 
toms being relatively common in AD [63]. Edwards [64] 
suggested that awareness of both the dementia itself and 
of space and time declines as AD progresses (but see [49] 
who found good time orientation in their AD group). 
When one loses orientation for time and space, one be- 
comes less connected with reality. SST focuses on time 
perspective so it is important to assess this in AD. 
Some researchers therefore find a lack of awareness in 
AD while others say that it remains even in the later 
stages. Clare [65] suggested that careful interpretation of 
patient subjective reports is important because denial, 
apathy, impaired verbal expression, confusion and alexi- 
thymia are all common in AD, and all could be inter- 
preted as “lack of awareness” when the patient actually 
remains aware of their developing difficulties. Research 
in this area is difficult but necessary because it would be 
worthwhile to know whether there are specific subgroups 
within the AD population who have different levels of 
insight and if so how this affects their motivation, social 
goals, emotional processing and ultimately quality of life 
(QoL): wide-spread individual differences have been 
reported suggesting that QoL is not always diminished in 
AD [49]. 
4. DISCUSSION 
There are no studies which have so far directly exa- 
mined SST in AD. This article was written in an attempt 
to investigate whether the main premises of SST could 
also hold for people with AD. With regard to the positi- 
vity bias suggested by SST for the healthy elderly some 
studies have found that emotional meaning can enhance 
memory for verbal and visual stimuli in AD [30-34], and 
this might be especially true for extremely arousing 
real-life events [30]. However, Adolphs et al. [26], Ken- 
singer et al. [28] and Mori et al. [29] among others found 
no EMA in AD. When an EMA is found, whether there 
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is then a specific bias for positive over negative stimuli 
in AD is questionable however as only a couple of stu- 
dies have tackled this issue (a positive bias was reported 
by Hamann et al. [37] while Fleming et al. [38] found a 
negative bias in their AD participants). Of course, posi- 
tivity biases are also not always found in the healthy el- 
derly population; individual differences are widespread. 
Secondly, there are some indications in the literature that 
people with AD have the same social goal strivings as the 
healthy elderly. The family role is often the most impor- 
tant in their lives and contact (although it can be que- 
stioned whether this is patient-driven) tends to remain to 
the end with close relatives [48]. Thirdly, awareness is 
necessary in order to be able to form social goals in the 
first place. Some researchers have suggested that many 
people with AD lack awareness, especially as the disease 
progresses (e.g. [60]; but see Clare [65] who believes 
that aspects of awareness remain even in the later stages). 
A key concept of SST is awareness that time is limited. 
Time orientation in AD has not yet been thoroughly in- 
vestigated. Nevertheless, Cotrell and Hooker [49] re- 
ported that most of their AD patients had good time ori- 
entation in that they recognized that they had a limited 
amount of time left. 
Another issue which must be addressed is whether 
those with AD actively pursue their social goals or whe- 
ther their social lives simply happen to them in a passive 
way. Individuals with AD might not take the initiative in 
seeking out close friends and family (as suggested by 
SST) either due to their cognitive impairments or due to 
the context they find themselves in (as behavioral symp- 
toms increase more of these people end up in institutions 
making social contacts necessarily more limited). Smal- 
ler, closer social networks in AD individuals might the- 
refore not be due to consciously or unconsciously chan- 
ging social goals (as suggested by SST) but rather due to 
their symptoms, living context, how the person them- 
selves, their partner, family and close friends react to the 
AD and the many changes which accompany the disor- 
der over time. The question thus remains as to whether 
this shrinkage of the social network in AD is a passive 
process (over which the patient has little direct influence) 
or whether they do indeed have social goals as suggested 
by SST for the healthy elderly. 
It may also be the case that SST may apply only to 
certain subgroups of elderly people (both within the hea- 
lthy and demented populations) and only when using 
certain tasks. Which subgroups, individual differences, 
tasks etc., could all be systematically investigated. Some 
suggestions and recommendations for future studies are 
listed in Figure 1. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Knowing what is spared and what is not in AD will 
have important consequences for the future care of these 
individuals. The premises of SST can provide one ap- 
proach towards discovering both what is spared and what 
is personally important to these people. Blessing et al. 
[36] concluded that the implicit emotional memory sys- 
tem was spared in AD and that this had implications for 
treatment. Specifically, while AD individuals may forget 
explicit information (e.g. about people and events in eve- 
ryday life) they may still be influenced by the emotional 
valence of these interactions. Emphasising these aspects 
may help them cope better with everyday encounters and 
may even help them retain information which might oth- 
erwise be lost. A fundamental move away from the tradi-
tional palliative to a more active approach, especially in 
monitoring the person with AD as the dementia pro- 
gresses is the one favored by this author and indeed by 
others in the field (e.g. [50]). A shift too towards the in- 
dividual with AD and away from treating them as a pa- 
tient who is impossible to test or treat is clearly re- 
quired. A recent review [50] addressed the perspectives 
of individuals with AD and concluded that there was no 
support for the widespread assumption that those living 
with dementia are suffering. Indeed, the literature which 
does address the AD individual’s perspective (e.g. [47]) 
suggests that they do not all accept the disease passively, 
that both emotion- and problem-focused coping are com- 
mon, that compensation strategies change as the demen- 
tia progresses and that individual differences are wide- 
spread: some cope better than others. 
This review has clinical significance for the treatment 
of AD because it focuses on what is important to the in- 
dividual with AD rather than treating patients as a ho- 
mogenous group. It also highlights the importance of 
social networks and emphasizes the role of the proxy in 
the care for people with AD. It also suggests that if those 
with AD (like the healthy elderly) have a positivity bias 
then positive emotional stimuli/wording/instructions could 
usefully be employed in their day-to-day treatment. Indi- 
vidual, case-focused treatment will become more im- 
portant as the population ages and AD becomes more 
widespread. Researchers are becoming more aware that 
AD is a heterogeneous group of individuals with differ- 
rent personalities, coping strategies, medical and per- 
sonal histories, goals, wishes and disease trajectories. A 
single pharmacological agent, or indeed a combination, 
is therefore unlikely to help all individuals with AD. 
To summarize, it would appear that people with AD 
also strive for emotional closeness and family bonds as is 
indeed often the case in the healthy elderly. However it is 
premature to say whether SST applies to those with AD. 
Fundamental research is clearly required in this area with 
the focus on what matters to these people as the dementia 
progresses. Multi-level, individually-driven treatments are 
likely to become more commonplace in future and ex- 
eriments based on the premises of SST could be a use- p  
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Figure 1. Recommendations for future SST studies in both the healthy elderly and in those with AD (see 
text for relevant references and detailed explanations). 
 
ful starting point when attempting to: 1) investigate what 
matters to people with AD, in other words, the individual’s 
perspective; 2) highlight what may be spared in AD 
(cognitively and behaviorally) and how this changes over 
time; and 3) ultimately develop an active, individual- 
based approach to treatment where emotionnally valent 
stimuli may play a crucial role. AD is a bio-psychosocial 
phenomenon [66] not just a “memory disorder” after all. 
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